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The 9th Technology of Otherness:   
A certain kind of debt1 
 
And the man who gave Socrates the poison now 
and then looked at his feet and legs and after a 
while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if 
he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, 
and so upwards and upwards, and showed us 
that he was cold and stiff. And Socrates felt them 
himself, and said: When the poison reaches the 
heart that will be the end. He was beginning to 
grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered 
his face, for he had covered himself up, and said 
– they were his last words – he said:  Crito, I 
owe a cock [έναν κόκορα] to Asclepius; will you 
remember to pay the debt?  
Plato, Phaedo.2 
Strange Debt  
The question of debt, especially as the last words Socrates was purported to have whispered moments 
before he succumbed to the hemlock, remains a vexed and oddly intractable one; perhaps even more so 
when encountered initially amongst writings in a book on queer sensibilities.  But it may not be as 
strange as it might at first appear and, indeed, as we shall see after dispatching with two of the more 
well-known interpretations, it may at least begin to provide an initial glimpse into a heterogeneic ‘post-’ 
postmodern ethics, one fuelled by a particular kind of debt, generated by a certain curiosity (zētēsis), 
and propelled by a queer, strange, sexual-carnal /ethical-political-aesthetic truth (parrhēsia).3  It is a 
                                                        
1 The 9th Technology of Otherness was commissioned by Henry Rogers for his edited collection, Queer Textualities, 
(London/Birmingham: ARTicle Press/ OSB Publishing, 2013).  It is gratefully reprinted here with the Editor’s permission.  
 
2 Plato, Phaedo: The Last Hours of Socrates, translated by Benjamin Jowett, (The Project Gutenberg Ebook: 2008). Updated Jan 
15, 2013 at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1658/1658-h/1658-h.htm.    Translations vary as to whether Socrates is purported to 
have used “I” or “we” with respect to the owing of the cock to Asclepius.  We will keep the Gutenberg translation but later in the 
argument will draw upon Foucault’s use of ‘we’ to develop a more general point about the care of the self especially in relation 
to the true.   
 
3 A point to which we will return momentarily, but see: Michel Foucault, “15 February, The First Hour,” in his The Courage of 
Truth: The Government of Self and Others II, Lectures at the Collège de France 1983-1984, translated by Graham Burchell, 
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blood-debt poetics, this oddly lubricated economy, with ethical difference at its core, courage as its 
trope and a communal ‘care of the self’ as its technology – what we will name as the 9th technology of 
otherness. 
 
Before developing that intricate claim, let us turn briefly to Nietzsche and then to Derrida.  
 
In one of the most famous interpretations of Socrates’ dying words, Nietzsche concludes, along with 
many others, that because Asclepius was the God of Healing and because the very last words on the 
mind of Socrates was to ask Crito not to forget to pay off, as Nietzsche would phrase it, a “ridiculous 
debt” to this (and no other) god, Socrates seemed to have undergone a deathbed conversion – one born 
out of a fear of dying, belying, thought Nietzsche, a grave and deeply secretive pessimism. For 
Nietzsche, this was the complete reversal of all Socrates stood for during the whole of his life. 
 
This ridiculous and terrible ‘last word’ means for those who have ears: “O Crito, life is a 
disease.” Is it possible that a man like him, who had lived cheerfully and like a soldier in the 
sight of everyone, should have been a pessimist? He had merely kept a cheerful mien whilst 
concealing all his life long his ultimate judgment, his inmost feeling. Socrates, Socrates 
suffered life!  And then he still revenged himself – with this veiled, gruesome, pious, and 
blasphemous saying. Did a Socrates need such revenge? Did his overrich virtue lack an ounce 
of magnanimity?  -- Alas, my friends, we must overcome even the Greeks!4 
 
On a rather different note, Derrida’s interpretation(s) announce a multiple doubling of an 
inheritance/debt, an inscription of a last will and testament by a dying man (Socrates) whose words are 
recorded by someone (Plato) who, despite not even being present at the moment of utterance – 
apparently he was sick on the day – must nevertheless suppose a memory (or, in any case, a ‘not 
                                                                                                                                                              
(New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011), pp. 86-89.  Note: the Socratic form of parrhēsia (ēthos) carefully sidesteps the carnal-
knowledge practice of body, sex, sweat – but as we will see, this is not just an ‘interesting’ aspect of queer parrhēsia, it is its 
verification. 
 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Dying Socrates,” in his The Gay Science (with a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs), 
translated with commentary by W. Kaufman, (New York: Vintage, 1974), section 340, p. 272.  The earlier part of the aphorism 
gives the full sense of his disappointment: “I admire the courage and wisdom of Socrates in everything he did, said – and did not 
say. This mocking and enamored monster and pied piper of Athens, who made the most overweening youths tremble and sob, 
was not only the wisest chatterer of all time: he was equally great in silence. I wish he had remained taciturn also at the last 
moment of his life; in that case he might belong to a still higher order of spirits. Whether it was death or the poison or piety or 
malice—something loosened his tongue at that moment and he said; “O Crito, I owe Asclepius a rooster.” This ridiculous and 
terrible ‘last word’ means for those who have ears: “O Crito, life is a disease.”  
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forgetting’) of an event which may or may not have taken place, by someone whose authority he 
wishes to break but, by writing those last words, instead immortalizes that very authority.  Plato, caught 
as both receiver & sender, is now also con-joined to Socrates  “from behind” by virtue of the 
reciprocating journeying inheritance of inscription.5  Here the end-game becomes a double entendre 
mid-game and in so doing, entirely changes the rules of the game.  As Derrida so vividly (and oddly 
homo-cidally) enframes it: Socrates could be said to be eternally fucked by a Plato who may or may 
not be aware of what he is doing and indeed must do.  Plato: the devoted pupil-inheritor on the one 
hand, the knowledge-transfer disseminator on the other; receiver and sender, Plato enacts the double-
bind which looks a lot like an innocent placebo but generates the pleasure/pain sadomasochism of the 
pharmakon. And all the while, the debt-cock just keeps on growing. 
 
Over to Derrida: 
5 June 1977.  […] I have not yet recovered from this revelatory catastrophe. Plato behind 
Socrates. Behind he has always been, as it is thought, but not like that. Me, I always knew it, 
and they did too, those two I mean. What a couple. Socrates turns his back to Plato who has 
made him write what he wanted while pretending to receive it from him. […] And since Plato 
writes, without writing, without wanting that a trace be preserved, since he writes, without 
writing, that Socrates, who passes for someone who has never written, in truth will have 
written, whether this is known (or not) and will have written just that which he will have 
written (but who, he?), you can try to forward the inheritance… 
5 September 1977. […]  P.S. I have again overloaded them with colors, look, I made up our 
couple, do you like it? Doubtless you will not be able to decipher the tattoo on plato’s 
prosthesis, the wooden third leg, the phantom-member that he is warming up under Socrates’ 
ass.6 
                                                        
5 See for example 4 September 1977 where Derrida explains: “When Being is thought on the basis of the gift of the es gibt (sorry 
for the simplifying stenography, this is only a letter), the gift itself is not something; it would be, hmmm, like an “envoi”, 
destination, the destinality, sorry, of an envoi, which of course does not send this or that, which sends nothing that is, nothing that 
is a “being,” a “present.” […] in Jacques Derrida, The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, translated by Alan Bass, 
(Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 61. But for the multiplicity/doubling of inscription and its circulation 
see also Of Grammatology, translated by G. Spivak, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974/1997), especially 
Part I “Writing Before the Letter,” pp. 3-94; The Gift of Death, translated by David Wills (London/Chicago: Univ of Chicago 
Press, 1996), especially Chapters 2 and 3 (“Beyond: Giving for the Taking, Teaching and Learning to Give, Death,” and “Whom 
to Give to (Knowing Not to Know), pp. 35-52 and 53-81, respectively. Also see The Politics of Friendship, translated by George 
Collins, (London: Verso, 2005), especially Chapter 4, “The Phantom Friend Returning (in the name of Democracy), pp. 75-112. 
Last but not least, his seminal Dissemination (New York: Continuum, 1981), especially regarding the pharmakon developed in  
“Plato’s Pharmacy,” pp. 67-122; and “The Double Session,” pp. 187ff. 
 
6 The Postcard, pp. 12 and 65, respectively. Italicization in the original. 
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Of course there are other interpretations to the last words of Socrates, though most of which, over the 
past two millennium+ of discussion thus far, tend to fall under the two broad headings as singled out 
above. That is, of a less than benign, suspicious or secretive ‘final thought confession’ or ‘deathbed 
conversion’; or, as expressing however enigmatically, a pharmakon-esque inscription of Being, woven 
into the very fabric of time, circulation, inheritance and debt, and therewith crucial to the (quasi-) 
transcendental movement of a trace, any trace – be it identity, sexuality, democracy, or indeed, life 
itself. 
 
Changing the value of currency (a certain kind of courage) 
 
Foucault proposes a wholly distinct approach from the broad outlines sketched above. It is one that, as 
we will see, not only introduces a methodological game-changer, but opens onto a completely different 
environ, quite distinct from the one encountered by Adam & Eve and their deeply troubled progeny.   
 
In the immediate months preceding his death in1984, Foucault delivered a series of 18 lectures at the 
Collège de France, published posthumously (in French, 2008 and in English, 2011) as The Courage of 
Truth: The Government of Self and Others, II.7  These lectures were a continuation of the previous two 
years lectures (from 1982 and 1983) and were situated around four practice-knowledge hubs or 
modalities of truth:  (1) the modality of prophecy/ religiosity; (2) the modality of the order of things; 
that is, of being (phusis); (3) the modality of demonstrative technique or tekhnē in the narrow sense of 
‘expertise’ and finally, (4) the modality that polemicized the human condition (ēthos).8  It was to this 
last economy of truth, itself a particular knowledge-practice form of parrhēsia, that Foucault begins to 
tease out what is at stake in the elliptical demand of Socrates to Crito: that Crito ‘must remember not to 
forget’ to repay the debt owed to Asclepius in the manner of gifting the cock.9 As we shall see shortly, 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
7 Op. cite. The Courage of Truth. 
 
8 See the whole of  “1 February 1984: First Hour” and “1 February 1984: Second Hour,” The Courage of Truth, but particularly 
pp. 15-19 and pp. 25-27, respectively. 
 
9 The general outlines of the concept parrhēsia are developed throughout the series of lectures on The Courage of Truth, but for 
this point see in particular, “Lecture One: 1 February 1984: First Hour,” pp. 1-22, and especially 10ff, as well as the afterword 
“The Course Context,” The Courage of Truth, pp. 343-358. 
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it is from the ‘certain kind of debt’ this fourth modality exposes, reiterates and promotes that the 9th 
technology of otherness is created and sustained. 
 
Invoking the motto of Diogenes to re-situate the entire polemic of debt and the multitude 
interpretations of its meaning via Socrates, Crito, Asclepius and the cock, Foucault steps away from the 
iterative fact of exchange, circulation and debt – let’s just call it ‘the market community’ – and, instead 
demands, as did Diogenes, that if you (read: we) cannot alter the fact of exchange itself, then at least, to 
quote Diogenes, “change the value of the currency” [Αλλάξει την αξία του νομίσματος].10  The 
currency in question could be said to be the general economy of truth; its value: the polemical 
condition of being human (ēthos). Its parrhēsia, Foucault argues, is a truth forged from the complex 
and yet completely obvious mix of curiosity, sensate, invention, experimentation, practice, bodily 
knowledge, power, movement and risk.  It is this truth that could (and did) change the currency; it is 
this truth that could (and did) emit a different kind of ethics; it is this truth that could (and did) draw a 
certain kind of debt; it is this truth that could (and did) shift the terrain of aesthetics from ‘the Beautiful 
and Sublime’ to that of an unquantifiable strange/estranged ethos. And it is this truth that required – 
and still requires – courage, because it is this truth that could rock (and did rock and still does rock) the 
status quo. 
 
“We can say then, very schematically, that the parrhesiast is not the prophet who speaks the 
truth when she reveals fate enigmatically in the name of someone else. The parrhesiast is not a 
sage who, when she wants to and, against the background of her silence, tells of being and 
nature (phusis) in the name of wisdom. The parrheisast is not the professor or teacher, the 
expert who speaks of tekhnē in the name of a tradition. So she does not speak of fate, being or 
tekhnē.  Rather, inasmuch as she takes the risk of provoking war with others […] the 
parrhesiast brings into play the true discourse of what the Greeks called ēthos.”11 
 
                                                        
10 “7 March 1984, The Second Hour,” in The Courage of Truth, pp. 226-228. 
 
11 “1 February 1984, The Second Hour,” The Courage of Truth, p. 25. The word ‘she’ has been used instead of the traditional 
translation of ‘he’ when the genitalia really should not matter to the argument; and, not to put too fine a point on it, in order to 
provoke ‘a war with others.’ (JG). 
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For parrhēsia to exist in the sense Foucault is developing means first that there must be some kind of 
bond between the statement’s sender and the receiver. Second, there must be some kind of risk to the 
exposing of truth on the part of the speaking subject, ranging from the breaking up of a relationship to 
the violent retaliation of the State. Hence, the parrhesiast and the ethos ‘to tell it as it is’ requires a 
certain kind of courage and risk. It is the courage to speak out, to provoke, to incite into action without 
taking oneself out of the relationship; to invent anew by supposing ‘it could be otherwise’ and then 
figuring out what and how this ‘otherwise’ might become real, alive, take root and flourish, without 
preventing the ‘telling it as it is’ from being heard even if it might wound or destroy the ‘messenger’. 
Not shock for shock’s sake; not offence just because it could be done; not a sterile rationality backing 
any decision; but rather, a certain kind of connection, a certain kind of care and attention to detail; a 
certain kind of courage, curiosity, stylistics of existence, generosity, intellect, humour – call it what you 
will – a complex/heterogeneic logic of sense to make ‘it’ known; to make ‘it’ happen, to make manifest 
a ‘certain kind of practice-knowledge’ of that which may not ‘fit in’ exactly or precisely (or even at 
all), but in spite of that (or even because of it), may put one’s body and soul at risk to make that 
polemical condition of life itself accessible, hearable, readable, graspable, right here, right now.12   
 
The Queering of Difference 
 
Now this parrhēsia, this ethical commitment ‘to tell it as it is’ was not, and could not, be made in 
isolation.  In the example cited above, clearly the courage to speak was immersed in / born of a 
profound commitment, connectedness, a friendship of the self to (another/an-other) self.  It required a 
courage buoyed or infused with the political, aesthetic, possibly dirty and unimaginable right ‘to know’ 
(thyself) in relation to this self-other. In so knowing, telling, making, doing, a radical, slightly more 
subtle heterogeneic form of the ethical was now being advanced by Foucault, one where the veridiction 
                                                        
12 See “1 February 1984: The First Hour,” in The Courage of Truth, p. 11, where Foucault details it this way: “The parrhesiast 
gives his opinion, he says what he thinks, he personally signs, as it were, the truth he states, he binds himself to this truth, and he 
is consequently bound to it and by it. But this is not enough. For after all, a teacher, a grammarian or a geometer, may say 
something true about the grammar or geometry they teach, a truth which they believe, which they think. And yet we will not call 
this parrhēsia. We will not say that the geometer and grammarian are parrhesiasts when they teach truths which they believe. For 
there to be parrhēsia, you recall – I stressed this last year – the subject must be taking some kind of risk [in speaking] this truth 
which he signs as his opinion, his thought, his belief, a risk which concerns his relation with the person to whom he is speaking. 
For there to be parrhēsia in speaking the truth one must open up, establish and confront the risk of offending the other person, of 
irritating him, of making him angry and provoking him to conduct which may even be extremely violent. […] In short, the act of 
truth, requires: first, the manifestation of a fundamental bond between the truth spoken and the thought of the person who spoke 
it; second, a challenge to the bond between to interlocutors… Hence this new feature of parrhēsia: it involves some form of 
courage.” 
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of the parrhesiastic ethos, would be (and must be) maintained as an ‘always-already’ plurality of self-
to-self collective connectedness. 
 
This heterogeneic plurality of ‘self’ exposed yet another set of multiplicities. For parrhēsia of the 
fourth modality encounter, requires in the founding/finding of this ethical multiplicity – this economy 
of living – a recognition on both ‘sides’ of the self-to-self relation that a particular governance or care 
must take place. This governance not only concerned the quality of life itself: that in order for the 
(heterogeneic/pluralised) self to survive and, indeed, thrive, a radical governance or care of the self, 
brought to bear by ‘telling it as it is’, must always remain critically embedded into one’s relational 
being in the world. But it also meant that this embeddeness, this ethical ‘currency’ must somehow be 
repeated; must somehow be ‘circulated’ time after time. And as it was premised on, indeed required a 
public ‘other’ – neither priest, nor teacher nor technician, nor police – but rather the parrahesiac 
‘other’, to tend to and to nourish, this generative and pluralised ‘self-to-self’ care, it was this 
recognition and insistence of this kind of care of self, that forms the context to Socrates’ elliptical 
remark ‘not to forget’ what most people tended to forget or did not even know it should be 
remembered: the pluralised ethical demand to care for the pluralised self.  “No longer political 
bravery,” writes Foucault, “but … the introducing [of] a certain form of truth into a knowledge that 
men do not know they know, a form of truth which will lead them to take care of themselves.” Thus, he 
continues: 
 
“I tried to show you how, in his Apology, Socrates defined his parrhēsia, his courageous truth-
telling, as a truth-telling whose final objective and constant concern was to teach men to take 
care of themselves. Socrates took care of men, but not in the political form: he wants to take 
care of them so that they will learn to take care of themselves. ”13  
 
Returning, then to the curious debt owed to Asclepius, to be paid in terms of the bird-cock.  As is well 
known, a debt of this nature is charged when and only when a specific body is known to be gravely ill, 
then healed (by Asclepius) and the resultant ‘thank you’ is manifested precisely as cited above. But in 
the last moments of Socrates’ life, there is no (apparent) diseased body; and thus there is no (apparent) 
                                                        
13 “15 February 1984: The Second Hour,” in The Courage of Truth, pp. 110.  
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healing; so why the payback, why the insistence to ‘remember not to forget’ and why link it to courage, 
the ‘courage to tell the truth (parrhēsia)?   It is because Socrates, as a living parrhesiast becomes in 
death, both parrhesiast and payback, the embodied ana-materiality of a polemicized ethics.   
 
To put this slightly differently, it is because, this ‘certain kind of truth’ is nothing more nor less than 
the Socratic prick that both lances the boil of a forgetting/concealing (with minor apologies to 
Heidegger), whilst simultaneously goading into action a pluralized ‘care of the self’, and with it, a 
profoundly heterogeneic economy of being, what could be called a ‘magic garden’ which must be 
tended to, cultivated, over and again. For magic gardens do not happen on their own; they require a 
profound willingness (courage) to engage in the dangerous game of ‘telling it as it is’, and 
remembering not to forget to pay the debt in the currency of a multi-dimensional, multi-relational 9th 
technology of otherness.  
 
Abstract 
Classical metaphysics requires a concept of the ethical that belies or erases certain forms of truth-
telling, often pulling the ethical in the direction of more sterilized forms of reason and rationality in 
order to invoke its universal applicability as a kind of ‘one-size-fits-all’ for any person, place, time, or 
thing. In so doing, not only does this tend to diminish or expunge the sensuous, carnal encounters of 
body and spirit, it pre-figures certain forms of courage, care and imagination so that the very core of 
what it means to make a community alive, responsive, and creative remains stuck in the old classical 
canons of thought and practice. In this way, the beliefs and ‘truths’ that tend to be reproduced serve 
only to strengthen the status quo’s status – somewhat of a problem if that status quo’s status is also 
mired in misogynist, homophobic, ethnic and/or racially divisive traditions.  The 9th Technology of 
Otherness, building upon Foucault’s Courage of Truth, the last lecture series before his untimely 
death, seeks to show how an ethics drawn along the sensuous modalities (as Foucault positions them) 
of courage (parrhēsia) and curiosity (zētēsis), creates a certain form of community, a certain kind of 
self, and with it, a certain kind of debt. It is precisely this debt that Socrates reminds Crito ‘not to forget 
to remember to pay’ to Asclepius, and to do so with the now quite infamous gift of the bird-cock. 
 
Keywords:  ethics, economy of debt; courage; parrhēsia; curiosity; zētēsis; truth; queer difference; 
magic garden; bird-cock. 
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